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ABSTRACT
A long-held view in the academy is that shareholders are
“residual claimants” in the sense that shareholders are paid in full only
after the corporation pays its creditors. The reality on the ground is far
different. Corporations give assets away to their shareholders long before
they have satisfied creditors, both voluntary contract creditors and
involuntary tort creditors. In particular, existing U.S. corporate and
voidable transfer laws allow corporations to pay dividends and make
share repurchases up to the point where the corporation is insolvent or
nearly so. Voluntary creditors can limit dividends and share repurchases
by contract, but involuntary creditors like tort claimants cannot, and
unsophisticated voluntary creditors rarely do so. I use a simple BlackScholes model of a debtor firm to illustrate the incentive that shareholders
have to take dividends and share repurchases before debts are repaid. I
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then present data on the huge payouts of asset value by indebted U.S.
publicly-traded corporations from 2010 to 2018. While good for
shareholders, the permissiveness of corporate payout rules brings with it
substantial social costs. Dividends and repurchases (1) dramatically
increase the riskiness of corporate debt, diverting large resources into
credit monitoring and speculation, (2) require a larger bankruptcy system
to process large and complex corporate failures, (3) make firms more
fragile and less resilient to financial crises, (4) unfairly shift costs to
involuntary and unsophisticated creditors in violation of the implicit
social bargain of limited liability, and (5) distort the supply of securities
toward riskier debt that is publicly subsidized through tax deductibility of
interest expense, simultaneously reducing the availability of safe assets
that are in high demand. It would be socially beneficial to restrict
dividends and share repurchases to corporations that have low debt and
adequate insurance against harm to involuntary creditors, and that meet
higher thresholds for wages and benefits. Such a rule would still allow
corporations to operate without doing those things; they could still have
high debt, be underinsured, and pay minimum wages with minimal
benefits. But if they did so, they could not pay out assets to shareholders
until they first met all their other obligations.
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INTRODUCTION
A long-held view in the academy is that shareholders are “residual
claimants” in the sense that shareholders are paid in full only after the
corporation pays its creditors. As Professors Easterbrook and Fischel put
it nearly thirty years ago:
“[E]quity investors have the residual claim. They stand to
gain or lose almost the whole value of modest fluctuations
in the fortunes of the firm. The residual claimants
therefore have incentives to invest in the amount of
monitoring likely to produce these gains (or avoid the
losses), net of the costs of monitoring. Debt claimants,
protected by the ‘equity cushion,’ are more likely to be
ignorant.”1
The influential Delaware Court of Chancery, often influenced by
corporate legal scholarship, has taken the term on for itself as well, stating
that “[i]n a solvent corporation, the residual claimants are the
stockholders”2 and setting out its most basic rules in such terms:
“[d]irectors of a Delaware corporation owe fiduciary duties to the
corporation and its stockholders which require that they strive prudently
and in good faith to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit
of its residual claimants.”3
The reality on the ground is very different. Shareholders routinely
get paid before creditors. In particular, corporations give significant assets
to their shareholders in the form of dividends and share repurchases long
before they have satisfied both their voluntary contract and involuntary
tort creditors.4 Existing law is quite permissive in allowing indebted
* J.B. Heaton, P.C., jb@jbheaton.com.
1
Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 91 (1985). See also John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 66 (1986) (“As the residual claimant, the shareholders receive all the
upside return, but, because they have limited liability, they can avoid downside
loss, except to the extent their capital is invested in the firm.”).
2
Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 172 (Del. Ch.
2014).
3
In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 20 (Del. Ch. 2013).
4
Financial economists recognize that interest payments and dividends or
share repurchases are substitute methods for reducing free cash flow. See, e.g.,
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corporations to distribute this cash to shareholders. As a result,
shareholders are hardly the “last paid” capital providers of corporate law
folklore but rather, first-in, first-out, and then some capital providers who
receive their capital back and much more while the corporation has
outstanding liabilities, often very large in amount. From the shareholders'
perspective, this behavior is optimal. When payouts to shareholders reduce
the value of corporate equity by less than the amount paid, shareholders
are better off, since creditors bear some of the costs of the payout but
receive nothing in return. Shareholders take the sure dollars today in
dividends and share repurchases because it is rational to do so and almost
never face a day in the future when they first settle up with creditors and
then walk away with the “residual.”
Two kinds of law purport to protect corporate creditors from
excessive dividends and share repurchases. Both are weak. First is
corporate law, which forbids dividends and share repurchases when a
corporation is insolvent.5 However, creditors have no direct remedy

Sattar A. Mansi and John K. Wald, Payout Policy with Legal Restrictions, 40 FIN.
MGMT. 701 (2011) (examining the use of dividend payments as substitutes for
interest payments in reducing the costs of free cash flow).
5
Restrictions of the payment of dividends while insolvent have long
been a part of corporate law. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Transparency
in Corporate Groups, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 33, 41 (2018) (“Even
as corporations became common and easier to create, the law imposed serious
protections for creditors, including par value and paid-in capital requirements,
limitations on dividends while insolvent, and the like.”); SV Inv. Partners, LLC
v. Thoughtworks, Inc., No. CV 2724-VCL, 2010 WL 11418154, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 10, 2010) (“An unbroken line of decisional authority dating back to the late
nineteenth century prohibits a corporation from redeeming shares when the
payment would render the corporation insolvent.”); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 513(a)
(McKinney) (“Notwithstanding any authority contained in the certificate of
incorporation, the shares of a corporation may not be purchased by the
corporation, or, if redeemable, convertible or exchangeable shares, may not be
redeemed, converted or exchanged, in each case for or into cash, other property,
indebtedness or other securities of the corporation (other than shares of the
corporation and rights to acquire such shares) if the corporation is then insolvent
or would thereby be made insolvent.”); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 510 (a)
(McKinney) (“A corporation may declare and pay dividends or make other
distributions in cash or its bonds or its property, including the shares or bonds of
other corporations, on its outstanding shares, except when currently the
corporation is insolvent or would thereby be made insolvent, or when the
declaration, payment or distribution would be contrary to any restrictions
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against recipients of dividends and share repurchases, and the corporation
itself only has a remedy against those recipients who had insufficient
notice of their illegality. Second is voidable transfer law, which allows
creditors to recover dividends and amounts paid for shares when the
corporation is insolvent, unable to pay its debts as they come due, or
inadequately capitalized. However, creditors cannot easily enforce such
laws outside bankruptcy because the creditor typically must enforce
voidable transfer laws on behalf of all creditors and has no clear means of
being paid for its efforts since funds are returned to the debtor. Both sets
of laws use insolvency or near-insolvency (inadequate capitalization) to
trigger creditor protections. However, by the time a corporation is
insolvent or near insolvency and the law no longer allows dividends and
share repurchases, it is usually too late, resulting in a corporation having
paid out sometimes massive value that might otherwise have gone to
satisfy creditor claims.
Our current system also calls into question some parts of the
modern theory of corporate law. Corporate law scholarship identifies a key
role—perhaps the only “essential” role—of corporate law as allowing for
the partition or locking in of assets for use in a business.6 However, while
contained in the certificate of incorporation.”). See also Delaware statutes cited
infra at note 20.

6

The ideas are actually rather old but were rediscovered. Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000) (“The truly essential aspect of asset partitioning is, in
effect, the reverse of limited liability—namely, the shielding of the assets of the
entity from claims of the creditors of the entity’s owners or managers. This means
that organizational law is much more important as property law than as contract
law.''); see also, Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law
Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. Rev.
387, 392 (2003) (stressing “the role that incorporation played in establishing a
pool of assets that was not subject to being liquidated or dissolved by any of the
individual participants who might want to recover their investment.”). For
discussion that such understandings are quite old, see also Bishop Carlton Hunt,
The Development of the Business Corporation in England, 1800-1867, 3 (1936)
(“[I]n the seventeenth century the commercial advantages flowing from and
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scholars are surely right to assert that creditors benefit from an inability of
one or a few shareholders to dissolve the corporation, it is an overstatement
to claim that “they are protected by the existence of an entity that is
difficult to dissolve by the current owners. It is only with this protection
that the squabbles among those who manage the company will be of
limited interest to the creditors” because shareholders can collectively
decide to pay out assets in the form of dividends and share repurchases.7
This is hardly a convincing “locking in” of capital from a creditor's
perspective.8
The permissive allowance of dividends and share repurchases by
corporations has severe negative social consequences.9 First, it
dramatically increases the riskiness of corporate debt by diverting
resources into credit monitoring and credit speculation.10 Voluntary
creditors must charge a high price for credit ex ante to protect them from
the ex post effects of the existing legal regime, and many resources are
drawn into constant monitoring and trading on changing corporate
likelihoods of default and less than full recovery on corporate debt.11
Second, the existing legal regime requires a bankruptcy system that can
process large and complex corporate failures when they occur.12 Third, it
leaves firms less resilient to financial crises.13 Fourth, it unfairly shifts
costs to involuntary and unsophisticated creditors in violation of the
implicit social bargain of limited liability.14 Finally, it distorts the supply
incident to incorporation were becoming clear: perpetuity or, at least, continuity
of existence (and management) independent of that of members; ease of suit
against third parties or against members; transferable shares; unlimited divisibility
of the equities; and the distinct demarcation of liability for the debts of a
corporation, as well as of that for the debts of its shareholders.”). Hunt observed
that “[t]he importance of non-liability for the debts of members was urged, for
example, in the petition of the Silk Throwsters for incorporation in 1692: ‘If such
an undertaking should be carried on only by articles of partnership, the stock will
be liable to the particular and private debts of the several partners, and subject to
be torn to pieces by the bankruptcy of any of them.’” Id.
7
Edward B. Rock and Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to
Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J.
CORP. L. 913, 920 (1999).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
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of securities toward riskier debt that is publicly subsidized through the
deductibility of interest, thereby reducing the supply of safer assets.15
Part I of this article presents a short review of the relevant rules
that allow and restrict dividends and share repurchases, in particular,
contract, corporate law and voidable transfer law. Part II presents a simple
model of shareholder incentives to illustrate why it is so often in
shareholders' interest to remove assets from the corporation in the form of
dividends and share repurchases. Part III presents data on payouts of large
U.S. public corporations from 2010 to 2018. The data shows that large
U.S. public corporations take considerable advantage of existing rules by
paying out a large percentage of their existing long-term debt in the form
of dividends and share repurchases. Part IV explores the social costs of the
law’s permissiveness of dividends and share repurchases. A short
conclusion follows Part IV. There, the article proposes that both dividends
and share repurchases should be allowed only for firms that meet stricter
requirements, including safer debt, adequate insurance, and the payment
of socially-desirable wages and benefits.
I.

LEGAL RULES

A.

Contract Law

Contract lenders like banks can and do limit dividend payments
through covenants in loan agreements.16 Creditors can also use other
covenant violations to reduce investment and payouts to free up funds for
debt repayment.17 In recent years, however, such restrictions have become
less prevalent as so-called “covenant-lite” or “cov-lite” loans, which have
fewer covenant protections for lenders and have dominated corporate
lending.18 This competition for lending among creditors has likely reduced

15

Id.
See Linda Allen, Aron Gottesman, Anthony Saunders, and Yi Tang,
The Role of Banks in Dividend Policy, 41 FIN. MGMT. 591 (2012) (documenting
how banks limit dividends while their loans are outstanding); Sudheer Chava and
Michael R. Roberts, How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt
Covenants, 63 J. FIN. 2085 (2008) (showing that investment declines after a debt
covenant violation).
17
See Greg Nini, David C. Smith, and Amir Sufi, Creditor Control
Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1713 (2012)
(demonstrating that creditors actively enforce covenant violations to prohibit
payouts to shareholders).
18
See Mayra Rodriguez Valladares, Rating Agencies Sound Alarm About
Leveraged
Loans
And
CLOs,
FORBES
(Dec.
18,
2018)
16

368BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW VOL. XII:II
the positive externality that previous—and more demanding lenders—
generated for less sophisticated voluntary creditors and involuntary
creditors alike.
B. Corporate Law
State corporate law also limits dividend payments and share
repurchases. Under most corporate law, including that in Delaware,19 the
corporation's directors can declare and pay dividends and make share
repurchases so long as the corporation is insolvent and certain other minor
requirements are met.20 Interestingly, a valid dividend declaration creates
a debtor-creditor relationship with the shareholders entitled to the
dividend, who then may sue the corporation as creditors for later failing to
pay.21 The directors are personally liable for wrongfully-declared
dividends,22 and that liability extends to creditors “in the event of [the
corporation's] dissolution or insolvency[.]”23 But that remedy is
inadequate when the amount of the dividends and repurchases far exceeds
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2018/12/18/ratingagencies-sound-alarm-about-leveraged-loans-and-clos/#46e2b6894d6d.
19
Delaware is the state if incorporation of about 60% of the stock-market
capitalization of U.S. public companies as of December 31, 2018. Data from
Bloomberg LLP.
20
Under Delaware law, the corporation's directors can declare and pay
dividends out of its surplus (the amount by which net assets exceed liabilities and
the corporation's stated capital), or, if there is no such surplus, “out of its net
profits for the fiscal year in which the dividend is declared and/or the preceding
fiscal year.” 8 Del. C. §§ 154, 170. This is true only if the capital has not been
impaired, that is, fallen below the amount of the preference of any stock with
preference rights. Id. The directors of a Delaware corporation may cause the
corporation to purchase the corporation's own shares, again, so long as the
corporation's capital is not impaired. 8 Del. C. § 160.
21
See Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171,
1175 (Del. 1988) (“The general rule regarding the vesting of cash dividends is
that a contractual right of the stockholder to the dividend becomes fixed upon the
declaration of the dividend. Thus, upon a valid declaration of a dividend the
corporation becomes indebted to the stockholder, and the stockholder may recover
the declared amount in an action, ex contractu, against the corporation.”)
22
8 Del. C. § 174(a) (“In case of any willful or negligent violation of §
160 or § 173 of this title, the directors under whose administration the same may
happen shall be jointly and severally liable, at any time within [six] years after
paying such unlawful dividend or after such unlawful stock purchase . . . .”).
23
Id.
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the wealth of the directors as is often the case for large public companies.
Delaware law allows recourse by the corporation (not creditors directly)
only against shareholders “who received the dividend on, or assets for the
sale or redemption of, their stock with knowledge of facts indicating that
such dividend, stock purchase or redemption was unlawful.”24 Corporate
law thus provides little to no protection to creditors for the payment of
illegal dividends or the making of illegal share repurchases.
C.

Voidable Transfer Law

Voidable transfer law provides stronger protections, prohibiting
the payment of dividends and the making of share repurchases by an
insolvent—or nearly-insolvent—corporation and providing for direct
enforcement by creditors against transfer recipients. State and federal
voidable transfer laws (also known as fraudulent transfer or fraudulent
conveyance laws) prohibit transfers that are made without the corporation
receiving “a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or
obligation” if the corporation was “insolvent at that time or . . . became
insolvent as a result of the transfer.”25 The same laws prohibit transfers
that leave the corporation with “assets [that are] unreasonably small in
relation to the business.''26 The idea of unreasonably small assets has been
interpreted as a condition just short of insolvency.27
Insolvent firms cannot pay dividends or make share repurchases
under voidable transfer laws because the corporation receives no value in
return for the payment.28 But as with corporate law, the enforcement
mechanisms are weak. A creditor may sue to avoid the transfer, requiring
24
8 Del. C. § 174(c); see, e.g., PHP Liquidating, LLC v. Robbins, 291
B.R. 603, 608–09 (D. Del. 2003), aff’d sub nom. In re PHP Healthcase Corp., 128
F. App’x 839 (3d Cir. 2005) (“In the instant case, Defendants sold their stock
through stockbrokers and there are no allegations that Defendants were aware that
PHP Corporation’s capital was impaired. Thus, the Court concludes that
Defendants redeemed their stock in good faith. Accordingly, the Court concludes
that Section 174 of the DGCL does not provide PHP LLC with a remedy for
violations of Section 160.”)
25
6 Del. C. § 1305 (Delaware’s adoption of the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.05 (California’s adoption of the
newer Uniform Voidable Transfer Act), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 548(a)(1)(B)(i),
548(a)(1)(ii)(I) (federal version of fraudulent transfer law).
26
6 Del. C. § 1304; Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04; 11 U.S.C.A. §
548(a)(1)(B)(i) and (ii)(II).
27
For discussion of this and other solvency tests, see J.B. Heaton,
Solvency Tests, 62 BUS. LAW. 983 (2007).
28
Feinberg v. RM Acquisition, LLC, 629 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“[A] dividend is not an exchange for reasonably equivalent value.”).
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the return to the corporation of the money paid for the dividends or share
repurchase, 29 but has no right to the transferred assets or their proceeds
unless the creditor's claim has been reduced to judgment.30 While any
individual creditor could bring an action to set aside the transfer, the statute
has no mechanism for recovery of that creditor’s litigation costs. Thus, that
creditor bears all the costs of the litigation- likely to be fact-intensive and
expensive because of the need to test for insolvency - and must share the
benefits of the recovery with all creditors. Unsurprisingly, there is very
little litigation under state fraudulent transfer law outside bankruptcy.
II.

SHAREHOLDER INCENTIVES: A SIMPLE MODEL

The law provides only weak protections to creditors against
dividends and share repurchases by even insolvent firms, but that would
be of little concern if shareholders had no strong interest in receiving
dividends or selling their shares to the repurchasing corporation. A simple
analysis of shareholder incentives, however, shows just how strong those
incentives can be.
More than forty years ago, Fischer Black and Myron Scholes31 and
separately, Robert Merton32 pointed out that the equity of an indebted
corporation is analytically equivalent to a call option on the firm's
underlying assets with the amount of the debt repayment obligation at the
debt's maturity as the strike price on the option. We can use this insight to
understand the incentives that shareholders have to receive dividends and
share repurchases. We start with the familiar Black-Scholes call option
pricing formula defined in terms applicable to analysis of firm equity,
assets and debt:
𝐸(𝐴$ , 𝑡) = 𝑁(𝑑+ )𝐴$ − 𝑁(𝑑- )𝐵𝑒 01(20$)
29

6 Del. C. § 1307(a) (“In an action for relief against a transfer or
obligation under this chapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in § 1308 of this
title, may obtain: (1) Avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent
necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim . . . .”).
30
6 Del. C. § 1307(b) (“If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim
against the debtor, the creditor, if the court so orders, may levy execution on the
asset transferred or its proceeds.”)
31
Fischer Black and Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and
Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973).
32
Robert C. Merton, On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk
Structure of Interest Rates, 29 J. FIN. 449 (1974).
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+

7

where 𝑑+ = 3√20$ [ln 6 98: + 6𝑟 +

3=
-

: (𝑇 − 𝑡)] and 𝑑- = 𝑑+ −

𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡.
In this representation, 𝐸(𝐴$ , 𝑡) denotes the market value of the
firm's equity at time 𝑡, 𝐴$ denotes the market value of the firm's assets at
time 𝑡, and 𝐵 denotes the face value of the firm’s (assumed zero-coupon)
debt that matures at time 𝑇. As in the standard representation, 𝑟 is the
annual risk-free rate with continuous compounding, 𝜎 is the volatility of
returns of the firm's assets, and 𝑁(. ) is the cumulative distribution function
of the standard normal distribution.
We can assume without loss of much generality that the risk-free
rate 𝑟 = 0, which allows us to simplify the formula for the insights we
most care about here. The market value of the equity is then:

where

𝐸 (𝐴$ , 𝑡) = 𝑁(𝑑+ )𝐴$ − 𝑁(𝑑- )𝐵
+
7
3=
𝑑+ =
[ln 6 8: + 6 : (𝑇 − 𝑡)]
3√20$

9

-

and

𝑑- = 𝑑+ −

𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡.
Delaware corporate law requires directors to manage the
corporation to maximize the long-run interests of shareholders.33 If we
assume that the directors can pay out assets while the assets remaining
with the firm continue evolving in the same way after the payout, this
implies that the directors should pay out assets (as dividends or share
repurchases) in amount 𝑃 from the current asset value 𝐴$ so long as
𝐸(𝐴$ , 𝑡) + 𝑃$ ≥ 𝐸(𝐴$ , 𝑡)
where
𝐸 (𝐴$ , 𝑡 − 𝑃$ , 𝑡) = 𝑁F𝑑+,G H𝐴$ , 𝑡 − 𝑃$ − 𝑁F𝑑-,G H𝐵
+

with 𝑑+,G = 3√20$ [ln 6

78 0G8
9

3=

: + 6 : (𝑇 − 𝑡)] and 𝑑-,G = 𝑑+,G −
-

𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡.
That is, the directors maximize the long-run interests of
shareholders by paying out assets, so long as the assets from the payout
plus the remaining equity value is greater than the equity value without
33

See TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., No. CIV.A. 10298,
1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. 1989) (“Thus, broadly, directors may be said to
owe a duty to shareholders as a class to manage the corporation within the law,
with due care and in a way intended to maximize the long run interests of
shareholders.”).
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payout of dividends or share repurchases. Clearly, so long as the value of
the equity declines by less than $1 for every $1 paid out, the directors
should continue paying out, or, put in terms of option “greeks,” the firm
should continue to payout so long as the option's “delta” (the change in the
value of the equity for a change in the value of the assets) is less than or
equal to one as it must be, because every dollar removed from the assets
puts a dollar in the shareholders' pockets but reduces the value of their
remaining equity by less than one dollar. This is true because the
shareholders are able to benefit fully from every dollar paid out but bear
only part of the decline in the value of the assets. The rest of the decline is
borne by the creditors who receive no part of the payout.
If, however, the directors must also satisfy a balance-sheet
solvency requirement,34
𝐴$ − 𝑃$ ≥ 𝐵
that is, that the assets remaining after the payout are worth more
than the face value of the debt, or, if the adequate-capital test requires an
additional cushion of amount c, then
𝐴$ − 𝑃$ ≥ 𝐵 + 𝑐
that is, that the assets remaining after the payout are worth more
than the debt plus a small “cushion,” then the directors will pay out assets
𝑃 until the solvency constraint binds.
We can see the expropriation of creditors that occurs if we let 𝐷
be the market value of the debt (with face value 𝐵) before any payout and
𝐷G be the market value of the debt after payout 𝑃. Then it is clear that:
𝐷 − 𝐷G > 0
since, what the equity gains from the payout - the amount of the
payout 𝑃 less the difference in the post-payout stock value - is what the
debt loses:
𝐷 − 𝐷G = 𝑃$ + [𝑁(𝑑+ )𝐴$ − 𝑁(𝑑- )𝐵] − [ 𝑁F𝑑+,G H𝐴$ , 𝑡 − 𝑃$
− 𝑁F𝑑-,G H𝐵]
34
The United States Bankruptcy Code and state voidable transfer laws
define “insolvent” using a balance-sheet solvency test as the “financial condition
such that the sum of such entity’s debts is greater than all such entity's property,
at a fair valuation[.]'' 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(32)(A).
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which is greater than zero.
Of course, directors cannot scale down the operations of the firm
in a perfectly divisible way. Assets are generally lumpy, so payouts for
many corporations will be much lower, which would drive the corporation
close to insolvency. Note, however, that this is a constraint placed on the
directors by characteristics of the assets of the firm and their divisibility.
We would expect that where corporations segregate assets easily—such as
through a sale or spinoff of a division that is not necessary for the
remaining business or where the corporation's assets include a large
amount of cash, whether from operations or financing—then the
shareholders will have an incentive to seek the payout of assets from the
directors.
III.

DIVIDENDS AND SHARE REPURCHASES: SOME DATA

How extensive are dividends and share repurchases among U.S.
public corporations? To explore this question, I take all Russell 3000 firms
as of December 31, 2018 that have been in the Russell 3000 since
December 31, 2009, inclusive. The Russell 3000 is a stock-marketcapitalization-weighted index that FTSE Russell maintains to benchmark
the universe of U.S. public stocks, though it omits some very small-cap
stocks. This results in 1,560 listed companies and 14,040 firm years. I then
eliminate firm years where the prior year-end long-term debt is zero. This
eliminates 2,029 firm years and leaves 12,011 firm years. For each firm, I
collect year-end stock-market capitalization, year-end long-term debt,
dividends paid, and net share repurchases (repurchases net of issuances).
All data is from Bloomberg.
We are interested in the payout in dividends and share repurchases
in a given year, say 2012, relative to the prior year end's (say December
31, 2011) stock-market capitalization, and long-term debt. We use the
prior-year long-term debt because that debt is, by definition, not due in the
following year so we can be confident that most of it (barring refinancing
or repayment ahead of schedule) was outstanding in the year of the payouts
we measure. Long-term debt is only a lower bound on the outstanding
obligations of the corporation since it will not reflect unquantified,
contingent obligations and other non-debt liabilities that are not offset by
assets.
Table I presents data for all firms from 2010 to 2018 (we lose the
2009 firms since we need one year of past year-end values for every year
analyzed in the table). The median U.S. public firm in the Russell 3000
population is large, about the size of the smaller firms in the S&P500 in
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the relevant years. Median long-term debt is also substantial, exceeding
$450 million in all years and rising to just over $900 million by year end
2017. Median payout (dividends plus net share repurchases) rises
substantially over the period. While stock-market capitalization roughly
doubles as does long-term debt, net payout rises over five times.

Table II shows that the median payout as a percentage of
outstanding long-term debt also rises substantially during the period, more
than doubling from 3.7% in 2010 to 9.3% in 2018. The long-term debt-toequity ratio, a measure of how financially leveraged the firm is, decreased
by 2018, but not smoothly. The median long-term-debt-to-equity ratio is
2018 is 21.9%. The correlation between payout percentage and the longterm-debt-to-equity ratio is near zero but reliably negative. The correlation
is driven largely by the fact that some firms have very little debt, so their
payouts are very large percentages of their long-term debt.

2019 SOCIAL COSTS OF DIVIDENDS & SHARE REPURCHASES 375

Together, Tables I and II demonstrate that shareholders routinely
get paid out before creditors are paid. Large indebted U.S. public
corporations take considerable advantage of the ability to indebted
corporations to distribute cash to shareholders through dividends and share
repurchases.
IV.

SOCIAL COSTS
A.

Benefits

Before discussing the social costs of dividends and repurchases, it
is important to acknowledge their potential benefit. That benefit comes
from forcing the corporation to disgorge free cash flow that managers
might otherwise waste.35 This is especially true because of considerable
evidence that corporate managers are too optimistic about their firms,36
and optimistic managers are likely to waste free cash flow.37 But, while
35

Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate
Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986) (the most widelycited and influential work arguing that managers will waste free cash flow because
of agency problems).
36
See Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate, Behavioral CEOs: On the
Role of Managerial Overconfidence, 29 J. ECON PERSP. 37, 57 (2015) (“A large
and growing body of evidence suggests that a substantial share of top corporate
executives exhibit symptoms of overconfidence in their decisions.”)
37
See Dirk Hackbarth, Managerial Traits and Capital Structure
Decisions, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 843 (2008) (studying the impact
of managerial optimism on capital structure choices); J.B. Heaton, Managerial
Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33 (2002) (showing that
managerial optimism predicts pecking-order capital structure preferences and
problems with free cash flow); Winifred Huang-Meier, Neophytos Lambertides
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dividends and share repurchases do take cash flow away from optimistic
managers, evidence suggests that managers get around this problem by
avoiding the greater commitment of dividends in preference for more
adjustable share repurchases,38 and that more optimistic managers avoid
longer-maturity debt that ties up cash flow for longer periods of time in
favor of short-term debt.39 Thus, whatever benefits might exist in reducing
cash flow in the hands of optimistic managers, it seems likely that
managers are already able to loosen those constraints when they like. In
any event, long-term debt is a more effective way of reducing free cash
flow than dividends or share repurchases, because with debt the
commitment is enforceable through contract.40
B.

Costs: Riskier Debt

Our permissive allowance of dividends and share repurchases by
corporations increases the riskiness, and therefore the cost of corporate
debt, in turn diverting resources into credit monitoring and credit
speculation. Firms can pay out assets right up to the vicinity of insolvency
(the point where the firm would be considered inadequately capitalized
under voidable transfer law) and, because the enforcement mechanisms
for creditors in corporate law and voidable transfer law are so weak, they
can actually pay dividends and make share repurchases past that point with
and James M. Steeley, Motives for Corporate Cash Holdings: The CEO Optimism
Effect, 47 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 699 (2016) (finding, consistent with
predictions of managerial optimism, that optimistic managers are reluctant to use
external funds and hoard cash for growth opportunities, use more cash for capital
expenditure and acquisitions, and save more cash in bad times).
38
See Sanjay Deshmukh, Anand M. Goel & Keith M. Howe, CEO
Overconfidence and Dividend Policy, 22 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 440 (2013)
(finding that the level of dividend payout is about one-sixth lower in firms
managed by CEOs who are more likely to be optimistic, consistent with the
preference of such managers for internal financing); Pei-Gi Shu, Yin-Hua Yeh,
Tsui-Lin Chiang and Jui-Yi Hung, Managerial Overconfidence and Share
Repurchases, 13 INT’L REV. FIN. 39 (2013) (finding that managerial
overconfidence is positively correlated with the intensity of share repurchasing,
which is measured by scale, execution, frequency, and the difference between the
announced price and post-execution price).
39
See Ronghong Huang, Kelvin Jui Keng Tan, and Robert W.Faff, CEO
Overconfidence and Corporate Debt Maturity, 36 J. CORP. FIN. 93 (2016)
(finding that firms with overconfident CEOs tend to adopt a shorter debt maturity
structure by using a higher proportion of short-term debt).
40
See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
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little worry about the consequences if they expect the firm to remain out
of bankruptcy. This situation not only requires creditors to charge a higher
price for credit ex ante— especially where they substitute a higher price
for covenant protections—but also generates significant speculative
demand for risky debt and credit derivatives,41 and thus, for credit
monitoring that would be unnecessary if the debt were owed by
corporations that faced much higher hurdles to the making of gratuitous
asset transfers to shareholders.
C.

Costs: A Large Bankruptcy System

Our permissive allowance of dividends and share repurchases by
corporations also creates the need for a much larger bankruptcy system
capable of dealing with large and complex capital structures with defaulted
debt and unpaid tort claimants.42 For example, PG&E Corporation filed
for bankruptcy protection on January 29, 2019 because of potential
liabilities it faced in connection with California wildfires.43 At the time of
the filing, PG&E had nearly $20 billion of debt outstanding,44 and had paid
out $7.25 billion in dividends from 2009 through 2018. When General
Motors Corporation filed for bankruptcy protection in 2009, it did so after
a payout of more than $15 billion to shareholders from 1998 through
2008.45
The cost of a system for large corporate bankruptcies goes far
beyond the costs of the court system, of course, to include the enormous
professional fees paid to lawyers, accountants, and financial advisors.46

41

See Christopher L. Culp, Andria van der Merwe, and Bettina J. Stärkle,
Credit Default Swaps: Mechanics and Empirical Evidence on Benefits, Costs, and
Inter-Market Relations (2018).
42
See KENNETH AYOTTE, DISAGREEMENT AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE
COMPLEXITY (2018), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3276779 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3276779 (discussing fact that “many corporate
bankruptcies involve complicated, fragmented capital structures characterized by
many layers of debt.”)
43
Pac. Gas & Elec. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (2019).
44
Id.
45
Gen. Motors Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (2009).
46
Stephen J. Lubben, The Chapter 11 Financial Advisors, 28 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 11, 20 (2011) (discussing the cost of professionals associated with
corporate bankruptcy proceedings).
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D.

Costs: More Fragile Firms

Our current system also makes firms more fragile and less resilient
to financial crises. Defaults on corporate debt increase in economic
recessions.47 Because firms pay out so much asset value to shareholders
when times are good, they may need expensive bailouts when times turn.48
Aside from being more susceptible to economy-wide crises, firms
that pay out cash may miss valuable investment opportunities. The extent
to which corporations suffer from financing constraints that prevent
valuable investment is controversial, and we must acknowledge the
possibility of waste, but the evidence is close enough to think that there
are times corporations have positive net present value investments they
cannot take—with all the attendant costs to shareholders and other
stakeholders like employees, would-be employees, and communities that
would benefit from the investments.49 Evidence shows that firms that are
financially constrained benefit from large cash holdings.50

47

See, e.g., Dirk Hackbarth, Jianjun Miao, and Erwan Morellec, Capital
Structure, Credit Risk and Macroeconomic Conditions, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 519
(2006) (finding that yields on risky debt are, in part, compensation for
macroeconomic risks of recession).
48
On the disruptions and responses required by the most recent credit
crisis, see, e.g., Charles W. Calomiris and Urooj Khan, An Assessment of TARP
Assistance to Financial Institutions, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 53 (2015) (analyzing the
effects of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, including implications for justice
and fairness); W. Scott Frame, Andreas Fuster, Joseph Tracy and James Vickery,
The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (2015)
(analyzing the steps needed to rescue Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during the
financial crisis of 2007-2009); Robert McDonald and Anna Paulson, AIG in
Hindsight, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 81 (2015) (analyzing the controversial decision to
rescue American International Group from insolvency); David Zaring, Litigating
the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405 (2014) (analyzing various litigations
arising from the 2007-2009 financial crisis).
49
See, e.g., John L. Campbell, Dan S. Dhaliwal & William C. Schwartz,
Jr., Financing Constraints and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from the Funding of
Corporate Pension Plans, 25 REV. FIN. STUDIES 868 (2012) (finding evidence that
financial market frictions impact corporate investment).
50
David J. Denis and Valeriy Sibilkov, Financial Constraints,
Investment, and the Value of Cash Holdings, 23 REV. FIN. STUDIES 247 (2010)
(demonstrating that larger cash holdings increase firm value for companies that
face external financing constraints). But see Leigh A. Riddick & Toni M. Whited,
The Corporate Propensity to Save, 64 J. FIN. 1729 (2009) (arguing that saving
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E.

Costs: Harm to Unsophisticated and Involuntary Creditors

Our permissive allowance of dividends and share repurchases by
corporations also unfairly shifts costs to involuntary and unsophisticated
creditors, in violation of the implicit social bargain of limited liability.
Again, PG&E Corporation provides a good example. The company filed
for bankruptcy on January 29, 2019, after disclosing it would do so
because of potential liability for a wildfire that began near Paradise,
California, on November 8, 2018.51 The fire consumed 153,336 acres, led
to 86 fatalities and destroyed 13,972 residences, 528 commercial
structures and 4,293 other buildings.52 It is alleged that the utility’s
equipment caused the fire as there is considerable evidence that the utility's
equipment caused the fire.53 If the corporation is unable to pay in full for
the damages the fire caused, it will exit bankruptcy having paid billions of
dollars in dividends in prior years that were not available to pay such
claims.
F.

Costs: Distortions to the Supply of Securities

Our permissive allowance of dividends and share repurchases by
corporations also distorts the supply of securities available for investors.
There is likely an oversupply of risky debt and equity—high debt making
both debt and equity riskier—and an undersupply of safe debt equity.
Economists have argued recently that the supply of safe assets has not kept
up with demand, which the economists attribute to high demand from
emerging economies that cannot keep up with supply from slowergrowing advanced economies,54 but which is also due to the fact that
corporate debt is much riskier than it would be under less permissive rules
on dividends and share repurchases. The distortion is arguably worse
propensities are dependent on too many factors to be tied reliably to external
financing constraints).
51
Pac. Gas & Elec. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (2019).
52
Id. at 2.
53
Id.
54
See Ricardo J. Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier
Gourinchas, The Safe Assets Shortage Conundrum, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 30
(2017) (arguing that “[f]or the last few decades, with minor cyclical interruptions,
the supply of safe assets has not kept up with global demand. The reason is
straightforward: the collective growth rate of the advanced economies that
produce safe assets has been lower than the world's growth rate, which has been
driven disproportionately by the high growth rate of high-saving emerging
economies such as China.”).
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because it is subsidized by the public through the tax deductibility of
interest expense,55 riskier debt typically requiring at higher interest rates
and thus more subsidy.
CONCLUSION
As a means of making money, the corporation is unrivaled. It has
proven itself as the superior way of organizing business on a large scale
that involves the issuance of securities designed to attract stockholders.
The most important and successful aspect of a corporation’s financing is
that corporations are legally separate and distinct from other entities,
including their shareholders. It is legal separateness that makes limited
liability enforceable against all other legal persons, since the corporation
contracts and injures in its own name. Legal scholars have long claimed
that shareholders, as the residual claimants of this entity, have the right
incentives to monitor so that assets are left over for them when all the debts
are paid. But this view is naive. It ignores the fact that directors, elected
by shareholders, use dividends and share repurchases to turn shareholders
into first-in, first-out, and then some capital providers.
Our permissive allowance of dividends and share repurchases
helps explain how such a successful financing mechanism as the corporate
form can leave so many dissatisfied. Shareholders have a strong incentive
to pull assets out of the corporation because doing so shifts risks to other
stakeholders while giving shareholders all the benefits. One need not agree
with all parts of the criticism of share repurchases to see that there is
something quite compelling in the general argument.56 The corporation as
legal form, including the background rules governing dividends and share
repurchases, is designed to attract shareholders and will, sometimes at
least, poorly serve those who are not shareholders. Shareholders might

55

See generally, for example, Ruud A. De Mooij, Tax Biases to Debt
Finance: Assessing the Problem, Finding Solutions, 33 FISCAL STUD. 489 (2012)
(demonstrating that there are no good economic rationales for the tax deductibility
of interest).
56
Cf. Chuck Schumer & Bernie Sanders, Schumer and Sanders: Limit
Corporate
Stock
Buybacks,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
3,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/03/opinion/chuck-schumer-berniesanders.html (arguing that “when corporations direct resources to buy back shares
on this scale, they restrain their capacity to reinvest profits more meaningfully in
the company in terms of R&D, equipment, higher wages, paid medical leave,
retirement benefits and worker retraining.”)

2019 SOCIAL COSTS OF DIVIDENDS & SHARE REPURCHASES 381
face less organized resistance from creditors, employees, and government
officials, if they became truly residual claimants.
One possibility that deserves further study is restricting dividends
and share repurchases to corporations that have low debt and adequately
insured against harm to involuntary creditors, and that meet higher
thresholds for wages and benefits. Such a rule would still allow
corporations to operate without doing those things—they could still have
high debt, be underinsured, and pay minimum wages with minimal
benefits. But, if they did so, they could not pay shareholders until they first
met all their other obligations. The question is whether shareholders
would be willing to invest in corporations—especially indebted
corporations—that do not provide large payouts in the form of dividends
and share repurchases. That question remains for further study, but since
nearly all corporate wealth reflect secondary trading of shares and not
capital formation for new business, a push for rules in the proposed
direction would likely address the considerable social harm that our
current permissive regime is causing.
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